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* Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. 1 Introduction1
The study of the eﬀects of oil price changes on macroeconomic variables
using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) systems is now well established in the
economics literature, dating back at least to Hamilton (1983). The com-
mon approach to identiﬁcation is the recursive scheme borrowed from the
literature on monetary policy analysis.2 The typical assumption — used for
instance by Burbidge and Harrison (1984) and by Bernanke et al. (1997) —
is that oil shocks do not have simultaneous eﬀect on all the VAR variables,
while, only some of the variables, if any, simultaneously aﬀect oil prices. Yet
there is a wide debate in the VAR literature about the validity of the recur-
sive identifying assumptions. Some authors suggest that they will not hold
exactly in the data and that conclusions are not robust to minor deviations
from the assumptions.3
In this paper we focus on the eﬀects that news about oil supply has on
US macroeconomic conditions following the identiﬁcation strategy proposed
by Faust et al. (2004) in their analysis on monetary policy shocks.4 In
particular, we use information from oil futures and spot prices corresponding
to daily events classiﬁable as oil supply disruptions. This permits us to
avoid imposing an arbitrary recursive identiﬁcation. The news we select
can be interpreted as oil supply shocks in a broad sense, since they include
events of both actual and potential oil supply disruptions. For instance,
geopolitical tensions may drive up oil prices even in the absence of actual
supply restraints, but just because precautionary demand increases for fear
of future supply cutbacks.
We estimate the response of oil prices to unexpected shocks by regressing
separately futures changes at various horizons on spot changes. From these
regressions, we obtain the corresponding dynamic path of the oil price. We
then impose that the VAR response of the oil price to its own shock matches
the response estimated using futures data. The VAR that we estimate on
1We thank Jean Boivin, Fabio Canova, Andrea Finicelli, Oscar Jordà, Alessan-
dro Secchi and participants to the Workshop “Monetary and ﬁnancial implications
of globalization” held at Banco de Mexico for comments. We also thank Stephen
G. Donald for sharing his routines. Giovanna Poggi provided valuable research as-
sistance. We are solely responsible for any errors. The opinions expressed in
this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy. Address: via
Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome - Italy. E-mail: alessio.anzuini@bancaditalia.it;
patrizio.pagano@bancaditalia.it; massimiliano.pisani@bancaditalia.it
2See for example Christiano et al. (2005).
3See, for example, Leeper et al. (1996), Uhlig (1997) and Faust (1998).
4Faust et al. (2004) use changes in Fed funds futures around policy decisions to identify
monetary policy shocks. High-frequency data are also used to identify such shocks in
Bagliano and Favero (1999) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002).
3US monthly data from January 1965 to December 2005 is rather standard.
The variables are those used in similar studies: oil spot prices (WTI quality),
the eﬀective Fed fund nominal interest rate, the consumer price index (CPI),
industrial production, nominal wages and the money aggregate M2.5
The main results are as follows. First, impulse response analysis shows
that after the oil price shock industrial production decreases, reaching a
through after roughly one year, while the CPI level persistently increases
within a few quarters. Hence, exogenous oil supply disruptions cause stagﬂa-
tion (deﬁned as negative co-movement between the level of industrial pro-
duction and the level of consumer prices). Second, historical decomposition
shows that oil shocks have contributed to each of the US recessions of the
last thirty years. Third, over time, the eﬀect of oil shocks on CPI inﬂation
has declined. For robustness we perform the analysis using a recursive iden-
tiﬁcation of the shock (as in Burbidge and Harrison, 1984) and results do
not change signiﬁcantly.
A building block of our identiﬁcation scheme relies on the use of se-
lected exogenous events. Other works also follow this strategy. For instance,
Hamilton (2003) uses oil supply disruptions to detect oil price shocks, build-
ing on Hamilton (1985), who singles out exogenous oil supply shocks by
using dummy variables associated with some events – probably exogenous
to developments in the US economy – characterized by dramatic increases
in the nominal price of oil. Kilian (2006a) derives a measure of oil sup-
ply shortfall for several oil-producing economies by comparing the level of
observable oil production with the counterfactual level extrapolated by the
supply of similar countries not aﬀected by the exogenous event. Diﬀerently
from them, and similarly to Cavallo and Wu (2006) and Kilian (2006b), we
also pinpoint oil shocks due to the fear of future supply disruptions. Overall,
we ﬁnd that oil market event-day surprises are not trivial (the median daily
change in spot prices is 1 per cent) and that during the most recent build-
up of oil prices (since 2003) they have become more frequent and relatively
smaller than in the past. For robustness, we further estimate the dynam-
ics of oil prices by considering separately: (1) events unrelated to (possibly
endogenous) OPEC decisions, (2) events in the period 2003-2005 and (3)
big events (those with oil price changes larger than 5 per cent). Results are
unchanged.
In addition to the literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of oil shocks,
this paper also contributes to the reviving body of work that proposes news
about future agents’ expectations or changes in them as important sources
of business ﬂuctuations (e.g. Beaudry and Portier, 2006a, 2006b, Christiano
et al. 2007, Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2006). This literature shows that when
agents receive news that future fundamentals will be diﬀerent from what
was previously expected, their change of behaviour may inﬂuence current
5In particular this list is almost identical to that in Burbidge and Harrison (1984).
4macroeconomic aggregates, generating volatility, co-movement, and persis-
tence that are empirically plausible. Consistently with this approach, our
ﬁndings suggest that news about potential disruptions in oil supply has a
crucial role in explaining output and inﬂation dynamics.
Overall our results are similar to those obtained by other authors. Hamil-
ton (1983) estimates a VAR and ﬁnds evidence, later updated and con-
ﬁrmed by Mork (1989), that oil price increases Granger-cause real output
reductions. Burbidge and Harrison (1984) estimate VARs for ﬁve advanced
economies and ﬁnd that oil price innovations had a large role in the stagﬂa-
tion of 1973-74, but a minimal (except for Japan) in that of 1979-80. Using
the same approach, Hooker (1996) concentrates on the US and discusses
several possible explanations for the smaller impact of oil price shocks on
macroeconomic variables after 1973. Bernanke et al. (1997) use a modiﬁed
extension (by Hoover and Perez, 1994) of Hamilton (1985) and ﬁnd that the
eﬀects of oil price shocks may be aﬀected by the endogenous response of
monetary policy. Finally, our results are in line with those of Cavallo and
Wu (2006) and of Kilian (2006b), who ﬁnd stagﬂationary eﬀects on the US
economy of oil price shocks related to possible future supply disruptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section
we illustrate how we select news on oil supply disruptions and how we use
ﬁnancial data to estimate the dynamic path of oil prices. In Section 3 we
illustrate the results of the structural VAR analysis. Section 4 provides
sensitivity analysis. The ﬁnal section contains some concluding remarks.
2 Oil price responses to oil supply news
The identiﬁcation strategy that we pursue in this paper is described in detail
in Appendix A. The core of this strategy is the estimation of the following
equation at various horizons:








is the change in oil futures prices with
maturity h = 1,...,5 months between the day dt−1 before an event that we
classify as oil supply news and dt, the day of the event itself.
Equation (1) states that each day oil supply news hits the market, fu-
tures prices at diﬀerent horizons change proportionally to spot prices st. To
estimate the coeﬃcients of this relationship we need the dates of the news
and changes in spot and futures prices.
We deﬁne as oil supply news those events that lead to actual or possible
future disruption of oil supply — therefore exogenous with respect to global
demand conditions — such as hurricanes, wars, civil unrest and political ten-
sions in oil-producing countries, but also OPEC decisions to change output
or quotas, the discovery of new oil ﬁelds or the release of strategic reserves.
5Table 1: Oil price spot and futures following oil supply news: summary
statistics (percentage changes)
percentiles spot t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Jan.1986-Dec.2005 (125 events)
10th -3.68 -3.51 -2.87 -2.80 -2.45 -2.40
25th -1.78 -1.35 -1.34 -1.13 -1.04 -0.97
50th 1.02 0.93 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.71
75th 2.87 2.87 2.37 2.37 2.22 2.13
90th 6.22 6.13 5.18 4.65 4.68 4.25
Apr.2003-Dec.2005 (47 events)
25th -1.73 -1.20 -0.94 -0.77 -0.71 -0.69
50th 0.48 0.87 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.68
75th 1.86 2.17 2.04 2.01 1.97 1.95
We use data on the closing prices of oil spot and futures contracts for 1-5
months, exchanged on NYMEX from January 1986 to December 2005. On
the basis of the “World oil market and oil price chronology 1970-2004” and
of the “Monthly energy chronology 2005” we select 125 events.6 We then
measure the unexpected change in the oil price as the diﬀerence between
the closing spot price on the day of release of the news and the spot price
on the day before. We do the same thing for the 1- to 5-month ahead fu-
tures prices. If the event happens in the last week of a month, when usually
1-month ahead futures are no longer quoted, we take 2- to 6-month ahead
contracts.
The spot and futures changes are summarized in Table 1. The oil market
event-day surprises are not trivial. The median change is 1 per cent and more
than 50 per cent of price changes are below -1.8 per cent or above 2.9 per
cent. The change in oil spot prices following oil supply news is shown in
Figure 1. Those changes were relatively sharper — albeit less frequent — in
the ﬁrst part of the sample period. More recently, surprise changes have
been more frequent, but relatively smaller. In fact, since April 2003, the
beginning of the latest oil price build up, we record 47 events (or 38 per
cent of the whole sample), with a median change (0.5 per cent) equal to half
the median of the whole sample and with 50 per cent of the cases ranging
between -1.7 and 1.9 per cent.
In the whole period the number of big events, deﬁned as changes in the
spot prices larger than 5 per cent in a single day, is 25. For instance, in Feb-
6We download them from the website of the Energy Information Administration
(www.eia.doe.gov). An appendix with the detailed speciﬁcation of the events is avail-
able from the authors upon request.




























































































































































Notes: Daily percentage changes in oil spot prices (WTI) following oil supply
news.
ruary 1986 oil spot prices collapsed by 11 per cent following OPEC’s failure
to agree production. In late 1990 the Kuwait invasion and the subsequent
Gulf War caused sharp changes in oil prices with some increases of more
than 10 per cent followed by an abrupt fall of more than 30 per cent when
the US decided to supply strategic reserves (SPR) to the market. When
hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf of Mexico at the end of August 2005, oil
price spiked by “just” 4 per cent.
Overall, Figure 1 provides a reasonable picture of the time pattern of oil
price surprises as deﬁned in this work and it bears a good resemblance to
the measure of exogenous oil production shortfall recently constructed by
Kilian (2006a).
The scatter plot of price changes at various horizons (Figure 2) shows
that the linearity assumption implicit in our identiﬁcation procedure seems
well satisﬁed: the relative size of event-day change at various horizons is the
same, but for a scale factor representing the sign and the size of the shock.
We regress the oil market event-day changes in the contracts for horizons
1—5 months on the oil price change. We take the impulse responses as the

















































































































































































































































































































































8with standard errors in parentheses. In the ﬁrst month, the eﬀect diminishes
to almost 90 per cent of the impact eﬀect; it gradually dissipates to about 60
per cent of the initial value over the next ﬁve months. Looking at standard
errors, it can be seen that all eﬀects are strongly signiﬁcant.
One may think that since OPEC decisions may be, at least in part,
driven by market developments, oil price changes happening on the day
of OPEC meetings do no represent truly exogenous supply shocks. In the
second column of Table 2 we show that even if we drop the events related to
OPEC decisions, the responses remain the same. Furthermore, the responses
remain the same if we use only the events of the recent oil price build up
(third column) or, ﬁnally, if we use only events that caused oil price changes
larger than 5 per cent (in absolute terms) in a single day (last column).
Our measure of oil supply shock may — at least to some extent — be
contaminated by other important information that hit the market. We found
that on nine dates in our sample of oil supply shocks there were releases of
US industrial production and capacity utilization data, two variables that
according to Pagano and Pisani (2006) capture the evolution of world oil
demand and are useful in predicting oil prices. Therefore, to assess whether
our results are driven by these dates, we drop them from the sample of oil
shocks and re-estimate the regression equation (1). The results are similar
to those with the whole sample reported in Table 2. Furthermore, if we
impose that the impulse responses of the oil price in the VAR match this new
response measured from the restricted sample of futures data, the impulse
responses of the other variables remain the same.7
Our approach to the identiﬁcation relies on the assumption that the
futures market provides an eﬃcient forecast of the change in the time path
of the oil price or, at least, that risk premia in oil futures do not change.
The small interval we concentrate on permits us to assume conﬁdently that
risk premia do not change. We test the assumption that at horizons 1-5
months ahead oil futures provide eﬃcient forecasts of subsequent oil prices
by regressing the log of average oil price (the variable we have in the VAR) on
the log of the forecast for month t implicit in oil futures at month t−1,...,t−
5. The test that the slope coeﬃcient (β) is equal to 1 is supported in all
ﬁve cases (see Table 3). All estimates of the intercepts are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero, but a joint test fails to reject the assumptions of the
intercepts being equal to zero and slopes equal to one. This is not a problem
as long as a non-zero intercept can be traced to a constant risk premium:
only risk premia varying in response to the event shock would undermine our
identiﬁcation procedure. Yet, the small interval over which we measure the
shock should limit the latter possibility. Therefore, we assume constant risk
premia and conclude that this does not aﬀect our identiﬁcation strategy.8
7Results are available upon request.
8Pagano and Pisani (2006) show that risk premia on oil futures are correlated with
9Table 2: Impulse responses of oil price to an oil news
h Jan.1986-Dec.2005 No OPEC Apr.2003-Dec.2005 Big events
1 0.89 (0.03) 0.87 (0.03) 0.82 (0.07) 0.88 (0.06)
2 0.76 (0.03) 0.77 (0.04) 0.73 (0.07) 0.74 (0.06)
3 0.67 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03) 0.67 (0.07) 0.64 (0.05)
4 0.62 (0.02) 0.59 (0.03) 0.63 (0.06) 0.59 (0.05)
5 0.59 (0.03) 0.57 (0.03) 0.59 (0.06) 0.57 (0.05)
obs 125 80 47 25
Notes: OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses. The regression is the
percentage change in the futures price contracts at date t+h on the surprise
percentage change in the spot price.
Table 3: Forecast eﬃciency tests for oil price futures
h constant (α) slope (β) p-value (β = 1)
1 0.08 (0.05) 0.98 (0.017) 0.15
2 0.12 (0.08) 0.97 (0.025) 0.18
3 0.14 (0.09) 0.96 (0.031) 0.24
4 0.14 (0.11) 0.97 (0.036) 0.36
5 0.14 (0.13) 0.97 (0.041) 0.48
Notes: OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses. The regression is the
log spot price at date t+h on the log futures price contract at date t expiring
h months later.
103 VAR analysis
In this section we report the results of the structural VAR estimation. Our
monthly data set consists of six variables from January 1965 to December
2005. They are the oil spot price (WTI quality), the Fed funds rate, the
monetary aggregate M2, nominal wages, the CPI and industrial production.
All the variables, except the interest rate, are in logs and the VAR includes
a constant and dummy variables for seasonality. We implicitly assume that
there is enough co-integration so that they are jointly covariance station-
ary.9 We choose 14 lags according to the Akaike Information Criterion. In
monthly data, 12 lags are usually enough to eliminate autocorrelation of
residuals. In our case a speciﬁcation search performed with Akaike infor-
mation criterion suggests that the correct speciﬁcation is between 12 and
14 lags (depending on the lags included in the test). We use 14 lags as
a benchmark because, even if 12 lags may be enough, two more lags may
capture the remaining seasonality even after the inclusion of seasonal dum-
mies. Moreover, many macroeconomic time series are well approximated
by second-order AR models (Kim, 1999). Anyway, our results are robust
regardless of 12-lag, 13-lag or 14-lag speciﬁcation.
The industrial production index is our measure of economic activity.
The remaining variables capture some of the most important transmission
channels through which oil prices may aﬀect economic activity indirectly.
Eﬀects of oil prices on CPI induce changes in real economic activity through
changes in relative prices. There can be a monetary channel, given that
short-term interest rates and M2 can react to inﬂationary pressures. Finally,
a labour market channel is introduced by using a nominal wage index.10
In what follows we initially perform an impulse response analysis to
understand how macroeconomic variables react to an oil price shock. Sub-
sequently, we also analyse the eﬀects of oil price shocks on the historical
path of industrial production growth and CPI inﬂation.
3.1 Impulse responses
In Figure 3 we report the responses to 1 per cent oil price shock. The
bands correspond to the 68 per cent conﬁdence level and are computed
using Montecarlo integration. After the oil shock, the price level increases
and industrial production decreases. These movements are what we refer
to as stagﬂation. Oil price response is rather persistent: in the ﬁrst 12
business-cycle indicators, such as the degree of capacity utilization in manufacturing,
at horizons longer than four months. More importantly, they show also that at short
horizons (1-6 months) the assumption of constant risk premia produces forecasts of oil
prices statistically not distinguishable from those obtained under the hypothesis of time-
varying risk premia.
9See Sims (1990).
10This variable may also capture second-round eﬀects of the oil price increase.












































































months after the shock, oil prices remain signiﬁcantly above the baseline,
to which they return only 14 months after the shock. Industrial production
decreases, albeit with some lag: starting from the seventh month it becomes
negative and, roughly one year after the shock it reaches a minimum value.
Subsequently, it remains below the baseline, for two years after the shock.
The eﬀects of the shock die out almost completely after three years. The
CPI is persistently above the baseline, reaching a statistically signiﬁcant
peak roughly one year after the shock. Subsequently, it remains above the
baseline in a very persistent way.
Nominal wages increase on impact, then slowly decreases towards the
baseline. The increase is rather small and not signiﬁcant. The Fed funds
rate signiﬁcantly increases on impact, it reaches a peak and then it slowly
decreases, until it reaches the baseline one year after the shock. The Fed
funds rate response is consistent with a systematic reaction, in a restrictive
direction, of the monetary authority: M2 persistently decreases, displaying
a classical liquidity eﬀect, in correspondence to the Fed funds rate increase.
123.2 Historical decomposition
To gauge the contribution of oil price shocks to the historical path of in-
dustrial production growth and CPI inﬂation we focus on the last ﬁve US
recessions, as dated by the NBER.
In Figure 4 we consider industrial production year-on-year growth. In
each graph the blue (solid) line is the diﬀerence between actual data on in-
dustrial production growth and the data obtained from the estimated VAR
under the assumption that no shocks hit the economy (the baseline projec-
tion), while the red (dashed) line reports the contribution of oil price shocks.
Cumulative innovations in oil prices explain almost all the gap between the
baseline and the actual data. The only exception is the second part of the
double-dip recession of the 1980s — after Volcker engineered the famous and
painful disinﬂation — which does not seem to be associated with any oil
shock.
Oil supply shocks contribute not only to real activity, but also to CPI
inﬂation, as shown in Figure 5. In particular, oil shocks help to close the
gap between the baseline and actual data during the two episodes of stagﬂa-
tion of 1973-75 and 1980, when CPI strongly deviates from the baseline.
Note also that in 1981-82, as for industrial production, CPI inﬂation is not
strongly associated with oil price movements and that, in the last two re-
cessions, actual inﬂation is much closer to the baseline, notwithstanding the
positive eﬀects of cumulative oil shocks. This result has two complemen-
tary explanations. First, other shocks having negative eﬀects on CPI may
have counterbalanced the positive eﬀect of oil shocks: for example, pos-
itive supply-side shocks due to increases in productivity or in the degree
of competition among ﬁrms. Second, in the 1970s oil shocks led to an in-
crease in inﬂation largely because of the monetary policy response: in 1974
and in 1979, thinking perhaps that the shocks were temporary, the policy
response was initially to ease monetary conditions. Inﬂation expectations
rose in periods when inﬂation was already on the rise, and this required,
later, a stronger monetary tightening. The increased credibility and trans-
parency of monetary policy after the early 1980s may thus have contributed
to stabilize inﬂation expectations, reducing the impact of oil shocks on CPI
dynamics. Indeed, as is evident from the baseline, average inﬂation declined
substantially.
The lower incidence of oil shocks on output and inﬂation is particularly
evident in the last few years. Yet, to investigate more systematically the
eﬀects of the latest oil price build-up, we re-estimate the historical decom-
position starting from March 2003 — the eve of the latest oil price increase.
The results of these analyses for industrial production and CPI are displayed,
respectively, in Figures 6 and 7.
As is evident in the two graphs, the oil price increase seems to have af-
fected neither inﬂation nor industrial production. Presumably other shocks
13Figure 4: Historical decomposition of industrial production growth in the
last ﬁve US recessions
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14Figure 5: Historical decomposition of CPI inﬂation in the last ﬁve US re-
cessions
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15hit the economy, more than oﬀsetting the eﬀect of the oil shock on output.
For instance, still expansionary monetary conditions, strong productivity
growth, wage moderation and globalization may have contributed to coun-
terbalance that shock.
4 Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of our results by conducting several
sensitivity exercises. They relate to the identiﬁcation scheme, the measure
of the shock and the sample size. Finally, we also re-estimate impulse re-
sponses using the methodology recently proposed by Jordà (2005, 2006).
This experiment is meant to support the VAR lag speciﬁcation and allows
us to perform a formal test on the signiﬁcance of the oil shock on CPI and
industrial production.
As a ﬁrst exercise we evaluate the eﬀects on impulse responses of the
parameter uncertainty in the construction of the matrix R (see equation (A7)
in Appendix A) by holding the reduced-form parameters ﬁxed at their ML-
OLS point estimates. Figure 8 reports impulse responses to an oil price shock
normalized to 1 per cent. More precisely, we perform Montecarlo integration
drawing parameters from the posterior distribution, but we use only ML-
OLS point estimates to construct the matrix R so that it is constructed
once and for all and not at each parameter draw. The responses of CPI
and industrial production are virtually unchanged but, as expected, the
conﬁdence bands around them are much tighter.
To understand how results would change when using a standard iden-
tiﬁcation scheme, we report in Figure 9 responses to the oil price shock
identiﬁed using a Choleski decomposition. We order variables as in Bur-
bidge and Harrison (1984), that is oil price, interest rate, M2, wage index,
CPI level and industrial production. Hence, the oil price shock aﬀects im-
mediately all the other variables.11 The results are similar to those obtained
under our futures-based identiﬁcation (and to those in Burbidge and Harri-
son, 1984).12 The variables react in a similar way under both identiﬁcation
schemes. The size of the industrial production median response is greater
using futures. A possible explanation is that our identiﬁcation captures oil
supply shocks, which have a relatively strong eﬀect on industrial produc-
tion, while the Choleski ordering confounds oil demand and supply shocks.
Note that while results are very similar, the results we get using futures are
11Note that in this case the responses would correspond also to the generalized impulse
responses described in Pesaran and Shin (1998).
12Following Sims (1990) we estimate the system with the variables in log-levels, while
Burbidge and Harrison (1984) estimate their VAR in log-diﬀerences. When we estimate
the VARs in log-diﬀerences (besides interest rate), results do not change. To save on space
we do not report them. They are available from the authors upon request.
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17Figure 8: Estimated impulse responses and Montecarlo intervals whitout
parameter uncertainty (futures-based identiﬁcation)
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invariant to the Wold order of the variables.13
Since our sample period for measuring the oil price responses to change
in futures prices is limited to the period starting in January 1986, we check
whether results change when we estimate the VAR on that period. This
check is also important because the historical decomposition shows a lower
response of consumer price inﬂation from the early-1980s on. Figure 10
reports the responses to a 1 per cent oil price shock. Remarkably, the shapes
of the impulse responses are similar across samples. In particular, responses
of industrial production are almost indistinguishable, peaking roughly in the
same period and with the same intensity. Consistently with the results of
the historical decomposition, the size of the increase in the CPI is less in the
smaller sample. The CPI is above the baseline and reaches a statistically
signiﬁcant peak seven months after the shock, but returns quite rapidly to
the baseline.
We also estimate the VAR on the whole sample, but allowing for a deter-
ministic change in trend CPI inﬂation in 1981, the period in which Hooker
13We have also tried alternative orderings of the variables. Results are not greatly
aﬀected.






































































(2002) ﬁnds a structural break in the US Phillips curve, or in 1984, the break
date envisaged by Bernanke and Mihov (1998). According to the results,
not reported for brevity, the response of industrial production to the oil
shock is literally unchanged. Indeed, the median response of the CPI seems
more front-loaded and less signiﬁcant with respect to that obtained without
allowing for lower average inﬂation, but given the wide uncertainty around
the median impulse responses, a formal test would reject the hypothesis of
diﬀerent sensitivity of the CPI to oil shocks.
Finally, we are aware that all estimated VARs suﬀer from a lag-truncation
bias, which in some cases may be extremely severe. Intuitively, this bias
arises because any speciﬁcation forces to be zero some terms which should
not. The OLS estimator would then adjust the estimates of the included
lags to compensate for those that have been wrongly excluded. In a recent
paper Jordà (2005) has argued that better multi-step predictions — denoted
as "local projections" — can be found by direct estimations of diﬀerent fore-
casting models, one for each step ahead, instead of iterating on a single










































































estimated model as in the VAR literature.14 In Figure 11 we report — to-
gether with the impulse responses recovered using our VAR representation
(dotted lines) — the impulse responses estimated using local projections and
the corresponding 95 per cent conﬁdence time-proﬁle bands (solid lines) as
in Jordà (2005).15 Eyeball econometrics suggests that both approaches pro-
vide almost indistinguishable results, therefore supporting the assumption
that our VAR does not suﬀer from the lag-truncation bias. Furthermore, by
using local projections, we are also able to test the hypotheses that the oil
shock has no eﬀects on CPI and on industrial production. The value of the
two Wold − statistics are respectively 79.22 and 59.56, strongly rejecting
the null of no eﬀects.
14Indeed VAR procedure is optimal if the postulated model correctly represents the data
generating process.
15Following Jordà (2006) we assume normality of residuals. Matlab codes to per-
form local projection estimates are available on the web on the Oscar Jordà homepage:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/jorda/index.html
20Figure 11: Estimated impulse responses using linear projections











































High frequency data have been used in VAR analyses to identify monetary
policy shocks. In this paper we study the eﬀects of daily oil supply news on
US inﬂation and output. We use this high frequency data to form identifying
restrictions for a monthly VAR. In particular, we impose that the response
of oil prices to actual or potential oil supply shocks match that estimated in
the futures market.
The analysis suggests the following main ﬁndings. First, news about
possible oil supply disruptions have a stagﬂationary eﬀect on the US econ-
omy. Impulse responses suggest that the CPI level increases in the ﬁrst few
months after the shock, while the industrial production level decreases in
the ﬁrst year. Second, oil shocks contributed to the stagﬂation episodes of
the 1970s and to recent recessions. Historical decomposition shows that the
oil shocks greatly help to ﬁll the gaps between the baseline and the actual
value of both inﬂation and industrial production growth. Third, over time,
the eﬀect of oil shocks on CPI inﬂation has diminished. This can be due to
various factors: the smaller size and persistence of recent shocks (compared
21with the shocks in the 1970s), structural changes in the US economy and
the diﬀerent reactions of the monetary authorities.
Our results are subject to two caveats. First, given that we rely on lin-
ear relationships between variables, we do not explicitly take into account
possible non-linearities. As suggested by some scholars (for example Mork,
1989, Hooker, 2002, Hamilton, 2003) the eﬀect of oil shocks may be rather
asymmetric, with oil price increases aﬀecting the economy and price reduc-
tions not. Second, macroeconomic time series may be not stable over time
and there can be structural breaks in the relationship between them (e.g.
Hamilton, 1983, 1996, Hooker, 1996, Barsky and Kilian, 2004). We share
these caveats with many of the contributions of the VAR literature we men-
tion. Non-linearities could explain possibly diﬀerent contributions of news
about oil supply to output growth and CPI inﬂation in diﬀerent periods.
The analysis of such possible non-linear eﬀects is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future research.
22Appendices
A Identifying oil supply shocks using futures
We identify oil supply shocks using information contained in futures con-
tracts. The initial step is rather standard. From the estimated reduced-form
VAR we get the structural form by relating the reduced-form residuals to
the structural disturbances.
Consider the reduced form VAR:
A(L)Yt = ut, (A1)
where Yt is G × 1, A(L) =
∞ ￿
j=0
AjLj and A0 = I. We assume that A(L),
which is a G×G matrix, is invertible. Hence, the system can be written as:
Yt = B (L)ut, (A2)
where B (L) = A(L)
−1.
We assume that the G reduced form errors ut are related to structural
disturbances εt as follows:
ut = Sεt, (A3)
where S is a G × G full rank matrix. The VAR in equation (A1) can be
made structural by writing it in terms of the structural shocks:
Yt = B(L)Sεt. (A4)
Suppose the ﬁrst column of S corresponds to the oil shock and call it α.





The gth element of the G × 1 vector of lag polynomials B (L)α traces out
the response of the gth variable to the oil supply shock. The Bs are known,
because they are implied by the reduced-form estimates. Hence, identifying
the impulse response requires picking the G elements of α.
To identify oil supply shocks we use the information contained in the fu-
tures contracts in correspondence to events classiﬁed as supply shocks. The
steps of the identiﬁcation procedure are two: (a) we derive the response of
the expected oil prices from the futures, (b) we impose the equality between
the VAR impulse response of the oil prices to the oil shock and the response
measured by the futures. Let us start by brieﬂy illustrating point (b) and
then point (a).
23A.1 Matching responses of oil prices
Suppose that, in the case of no uncertainty, the response of the oil price at
time t + h to an oil price shock at time t is rh, h = 0,1,...G − 1. Hence:
Bh,oilα = rh, (A6)
where Bh,oil is the row of Bh corresponding to the oil price. We can stack
these G equations to form:
Rα = r,
where the rows of R are the relevant row vectors Bh,oil and the elements of
r are the corresponding elements rh. We get Bh,oil from the reduced-form
VAR estimates. The response of oil prices to an oil price shock, rh, can be
obtained by using the information contained in the futures.
The above system has G equations in G unknowns (the elements of α).
Its solution, under the condition that R is of rank G, is:
α = R−1r. (A7)
If R is not full rank, as happened to be the case here, it is necessary to
add other restrictions in order to identify the system. In Appendix B we
show that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of rank four.
In the next section we show how the response rh of oil prices to oil
price shocks can be measured directly from the oil price futures market and
explain what further restrictions we impose on the system.
A.2 Measuring oil price shocks using futures
The oil price futures contract f for date t + h is a bet on the oil spot price
s on date t + h. Parties to the h-period contract agree in t on a price ft+h
for oil to be delivered at t+h. The standard no-arbitrage condition implies
that:
0 = Et [mt+h (st+h − ft+h)] (A8)
where m is the stochastic pricing kernel.
The previous equation can be rewritten as:




This condition says that the futures rate is equal to the expected future
funds rate plus a risk term.







on the day dt of events that we classify as oil supply shocks. Hence, as long
as the risk term in equation (A9) does not change on the day of the event,
we can write:
∆dtft+h = Edtst+h − Edt−1st+h ≡ ∆e
dtst+h (A10)
24where ∆dtEst+h is the change in expectations about the spot price on the
date t+h due to the unanticipated event that has perturbed the oil market
on date dt.
In the VAR the expected oil price at t+h conditional on information in





The change in the expectation ∆e
dtft+h from day dt−1 to dt is due to changes
in the expectations of shocks εs over this day, ∆e
dtεt, given that all the past
εs ( εt−1,εt−2,...) are known at the beginning of the day. In order to single





where α is the ﬁrst column of S and the matrix S∗, is equal to S with the
ﬁrst column replaced by zeros. We assume that the second term is zero:




Combining equations (A13) and (A6) we get:
∆dtft+h = rh∆e
dtε1t (A14)
where rh = Bh,oilα is the impulse response of the oil price to the oil price
shock at horizon h. Since this equation holds for every h, we substitute out
the unobserved quantity ∆e





The latter equation states that each day an oil supply shock hits the mar-
ket, futures prices at diﬀerent horizons should change proportionally. The
factor of proportionality is the same for each shock, while the magnitude of
the shock can obviously be diﬀerent. We estimate this factor of proportion-
ality from the data on futures contracts and use the normalization [r0 = 1%]
to obtain the estimated ˆ rh in our identiﬁcation strategy.
The above steps allow us to recover the point estimate of α. Given that α
depends non-linearly, through R, on the reduced-form parameter estimates,
the uncertainty surrounding the latter translate into large uncertainty about
the former. Following Canova and De Nicolò (2002), we mitigate this large
uncertainty by imposing the signs of the impact responses of three (Fed
funds, money and wages) out of the six variables in the VAR. In particular,
25we impose that the signs cannot be the opposite of the OLS point estimates
of α. Imposing such sign restrictions is consistent with the possibility of R
not being full rank and is in line with Faust et al. (2004), who use high
frequency futures data to identify a monetary policy shock in a VAR.16
Importantly, we do not restrict the variables of interest (CPI and industrial
production).
16Indeed, Faust et al. (2004) impose stronger restrictions than ours, since they impose
ranges (and not just signs) for all the impact responses of the variables.
26B Testing the rank of R
In order to test the rank of the matrix R, we rely on Cragg and Donald
(1997).
The null hypothesis is ρ(R) = k against the alternative that ρ(R) > k.
The matrix is a non-linear function of the reduced-form parameter vector
ϑ. Since we have an estimate ˆ ϑ of ϑ, applying the same non-linear function














vec( ˆ R) − vec(R)
￿
−→d N(0,VR)
where vec is for vectorization and







to test the rank of R we can use the statistic:












where π(k) is the space of all conformable matrices of rank k.
Under the null hypothesis, the test has a limiting χ2. We therefore test
the hypothesis H0 : ρ(R) = k rejecting the null if hypothesis if S(k) exceeds
the critical level α of a chi-square. Iterating the test for increasing values of
k, we were not able to reject the hypothesis of k = 4, with S(4) = 6.12 and
p − value = 0.19.
27References
[1] Bagliano, F.C., and C. A. Favero (1999), “Information from Financial
Markets and VAR Measures of Monetary Policy”, European Economic
Review, vol. 43, pp. 825-837.
[2] Barsky, R.B., and L. Kilian (2004), “Oil and the Macroeconomy since
the 1970s”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, pp. 115-134.
[3] Beaudry, P., and F. Portier (2006a), “News, Stock Prices and Economic
Fluctuations”, American Economic Review (forthcoming).
[4] Beaudry, P., and F. Portier (2006b), “When Can Changes in Expec-
tations Cause Business Cycle Fluctuations in Neo-Classical Settings?”,
Journal of Economic Theory (forthcoming).
[5] Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler, and M.W. Watson (1997), “Systematic
Monetary Policy and the Eﬀects of Oil Price Shocks”, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, pp. 91-157.
[6] Bernanke, B.S. and I. Mihov (1998), “Measuring Monetary Policy”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113, pp. 869—902.
[7] Burbidge, J., and A. Harrison (1984), “Testing for the Eﬀect of Oil Price
Rises Using Vector Autoregressions”, International Economic Review,
vol. 25, pp. 459-484.
[8] Canova, F. and G. De Nicolò (2002), “Monetary Disturbances Mat-
ter for Business Cycle Fluctuations in the G-7”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 49, pp. 1131-1159.
[9] Cavallo, M. and T. Wu (2006), “Measuring Oil-Price Shocks Using
Market Based Information”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Working Paper, no. 2006-28, September.
[10] Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (2005), “Nominal
Rigidities and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy”,
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, pp. 1—45.
[11] Christiano, L. J., C. Ilut, R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2007), “Mone-
tary Policy and a Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycle,” mimeo.
[12] Cochrane, J., and M. Piazzesi (2002), “The Fed and Interest Rates:
A High-Frequency Identiﬁcation”, American Economic Review Papers
and Proceedings, vol. 92, pp. 90-95.
[13] Cragg, J. G., and S. G. Donald (1997), “Inferring the rank of a matrix”,
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 76, pp. 223—250.
28[14] Faust, J. (1998), “The Robustness of Identiﬁed VAR Conclusions about
Money”, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, vol. 49, pp. 207—
244.
[15] Faust, J., E. T. Swanson and J. H. Wright (2004), “Identifying VARS
Based on High Frequency Futures Data”, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, vol. 51, pp. 1107—1131.
[16] Hamilton, J. D. (1983), “Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War
II”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, pp. 228—48.
[17] Hamilton, J. D. (1985), “Historical Causes of Postwar Oil Shocks and
Recessions”, Energy Journal, vol. 6, pp. 97-116.
[18] Hamilton, J. D. (1996), “This is What Happened to the Oil-
Macroeconomy Relationship”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 38,
pp. 215-220.
[19] Hamilton, J. D. (2003), “What is an Oil Shock”, Journal of Economet-
rics, vol. 113, pp. 363—398.
[20] Hooker, M.A. (1996), “What Happened to the Oil-Macroeconomy Re-
lationship?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 38, pp. 195-213.
[21] Hooker, M.A. (2002), “Are Oil Shocks Inﬂationary? Asymmetric and
Nonlinear Speciﬁcations versus Changes in Regime,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, vol. 34, pp. 540-561.
[22] Hoover , K.D. and S.J. Perez (1994), “Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Once
More: an Evaluation of ‘Does Monetary Policy Matter?’ in the Spirit
of James Tobin”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 34, pp. 89-99.
[23] Jaimovich, N., and S. Rebelo (2006), “Do News Shocks Drive the Busi-
ness Cycle?”, NBER Working Paper n. 12537.
[24] Jordà, O. (2005), “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by
Local Projections”, American Economic Review, vol. 95, pp. 161-182.
[25] Jordà, O. (2006), “Inference for Impulse Responses”, mimeo.
[26] Kilian, L. (2006a),“Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks: How Big Are They
and How Much Do They Matter for the U.S. Economy?”, mimeo,
Department of Economics, University of Michigan, http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html.
[27] Kilian, L. (2006b),“Not Oil Price Shocks are Alike: Disentangling De-
mand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market”, CEPR Discussion
Paper, No. 5994, December.
29[28] Kim, S. (1999), “Do Monetary shocks matter in the G-7 countries?
Using Common Identifying Assumptions about Monetary Policy across
countries”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 48, pp. 387-412.
[29] Leeper E.M., Sims, C.A., and T. Zha (1996), “What Does Monetary
Policy Do?”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 1—6.
[30] Mork, K.A. (1989), “Oil and the Macroeconomy when Prices Go Up
and Down: An Extension of Hamilton’s Results,” Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 97, pp. 740-744.
[31] Pagano, P. and M. Pisani (2006), “Risk-adjusted Forecasts of Oil
Prices”, Bank of Italy, Temi di Discussione, No. 585.
[32] Pesaran, H.H., and Y. Shin (1998), “Generalized Impulse Response
Analysis in Linear Multivariate Models”, Economics Letters, vol. 58,
pp. 17—29.
[33] Sims, C.A., (1990), “Inference for Multivariate Time Series Models with
Trend”, Econometrica, vol.58, pp. 113-144.
[34] Uhlig. H. (1997), “Bayesian Vector Autoregressions with Stochastic
Volatility”, Econometrica, vol. 65, pp. 59-74.
30(*)  Requests for copies should be sent to: 
Banca d’Italia – Servizio Studi – Divisione Biblioteca e pubblicazioni – Via Nazionale, 91 – 00184 Rome
(fax 0039 06 47922059). They are available on the Internet www.bancaditalia.it.
RECENTLY PUBLISHED “TEMI” (*)
N.   608  –  Merge and compete: Strategic incentives for vertical integration, by Filippo Vergara 
Caffarelli (December 2006).
N.   609  –  Real-time determinants of ﬁscal policies in the euro area: Fiscal rules, cyclical 
conditions and elections, by Roberto Golinelli and Sandro Momigliano (December 
2006).
N.   610  –  L’under-reporting della ricchezza ﬁnanziaria nell’indagine sui bilanci delle famiglie, 
by Leandro D’Aurizio, Ivan Faiella, Stefano Iezzi, Andrea Neri (December 2006).
N.  611  –  La polarizzazione territoriale del prodotto pro capite: un’analisi del caso italiano 
sulla base di dati provinciali by Stefano Iezzi (December 2006).
N.  612  –  A neural network architecture for data editing in the Bank of Italy’s business surveys 
by Claudia Biancotti, Leandro D’Aurizio and Raffaele Tartaglia-Polcini (February 
2007).
N.   613  –  Outward FDI and Local Employment Growth in Italy, by Stefano Federico and 
Gaetano Alfredo Minerva (February 2007).
N.   614  –  Testing for trend, by Fabio Busetti and Andrew Harvey (February 2007).
N.   615  –  Macroeconomic uncertainty and banks’ lending decisions: The case of Italy, by 
Mario Quagliariello (February 2007).
N.   616  –  Entry barriers in italian retail trade, by Fabiano Schivardi and Eliana Viviano 
(February 2007).
N.   617  –  A politicy-sensible core-inﬂation measure for the euro area, by Stefano Siviero and 
Giovanni Veronese (February 2007).
N.   618  –  Le  opinioni  degli  italiani  sull’evasione  ﬁscale,  by  Luigi  Cannari  and  Giovanni 
D'Alessio (February 2007)
N.  619  –  Memory for prices and the euro cash changeover: An analysis for cinema prices in 
Italy, by Vincenzo Cestari, Paolo Del Giovane and Clelia Rossi-Arnaud (February 
2007).
N.  620  –  Intertemporal consumption choices, transaction costs and limited participation in 
ﬁnancial markets: Reconciling data and theory, by Orazio P. Attanasio and Monica 
Paiella (April 2007).
N.  621  –  Why  demand  uncertainty  curbs  investment:  Evidence  from  a  panel  of  Italian 
manufacturing ﬁrms, by Maria Elena Bontempi, Roberto Golinelli and Giuseppe 
Parigi (April 2007).
N.  622  –  Employment,  innovation  and  productivity:  Evidence  from  Italian  microdata,  by 
Bronwyn H. Hall, Francesca Lotti and Jacques Mairesse (April 2007).
N.  623  –  Measurement of Income Distribution in Supranational Entities: The Case of the 
European Union, by Andrea Brandolini (April 2007).
N.  624  –  Un nuovo metodo per misurare la dotazione territoriale di infrastrutture di trasporto, 
by Giovanna Messina (April 2007).
N.  625  –  The forgone gains of incomplete portfolios, by Monica Paiella (April 2007).
N.  626  –  University drop-out: The case of Italy, by Federico Cingano and Piero Cipollone   
(April 2007).
N.  627  –  The sectoral distribution of money supply in the euro area, by Giuseppe Ferrero, 
Andrea Nobili and Patrizia Passiglia (April 2007).
N.  628  –  Changes in transport and non-transport costs: Local vs global impacts in a spatial 
network, by Kristian Behrens, Andrea R. Lamorgese, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and 
Takatoshi Tabuchi (April 2007).
N.   629  –  Monetary policy shocks in the euro area and global liquidity spillovers, by João 
Sousa and Andrea Zaghini (June 2007).
N.   630  –  Endogenous  growth  and  trade  liberalization  between  asymmetric  countries,  by 
Daniela Marconi (June 2007).
N.   631  –  New Eurocoin: Tracking economic growth in real time, by Filippo Altissimo, Riccardo 







P. ANGELINI  and  N.  CETORELLI,  Gli effetti delle modifiche normative sulla concorrenza nel mercato 
creditizio, in F. Panetta (eds.), Il sistema bancario negli anni novanta: gli effetti di una 
trasformazione, Bologna, il Mulino, TD No. 380 (October 2000). 
P. CHIADES and L. GAMBACORTA, The Bernanke and Blinder model in an open economy: The Italian 
case, German Economic Review, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 1-34, TD No. 388 (December 2000). 
M. BUGAMELLI and P. PAGANO, Barriers to investment in ICT, Applied Economics, Vol. 36 (20), pp. 
2275-2286, TD No. 420 (October 2001).  
F. BUSETTI, Preliminary data and econometric forecasting: An application with the Bank of Italy quarterly 
model, CEPR Discussion Paper, 4382, TD No. 437 (December 2001). 
A. BAFFIGI, R. GOLINELLI and G. PARIGI, Bridge models to forecast the euro area GDP, International 
Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 20 (3), pp. 447-460,TD No. 456 (December 2002). 
D. AMEL, C. BARNES, F. PANETTA and C. SALLEO, Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: A 
review of the international evidence, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28 (10), pp. 2493-
2519, TD No. 464 (December 2002). 
M. PAIELLA, Heterogeneity in financial market participation: Appraising its implications for the C-CAPM, 
Review of Finance, Vol. 8, 3, pp. 445-480, TD No. 473 (June 2003). 
F. CINGANO and F. SCHIVARDI,  Identifying the sources of local productivity growth, Journal of the 
European Economic Association,  Vol. 2 (4), pp. 720-742, TD No. 474 (June 2003). 
E.  BARUCCI,  C.  IMPENNA  and  R.  RENÒ,  Monetary integration, markets and regulation,  Research in 
Banking and Finance, (4), pp. 319-360, TD No. 475 (June 2003). 
G. ARDIZZI, Cost efficiency in the retail payment networks: first evidence from the Italian credit card 
system, Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol. 94, (3), pp. 51-82, TD No. 480 (June 2003). 
E. BONACCORSI DI PATTI and G. DELL’ARICCIA, Bank competition and firm creation, Journal of Money 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 36 (2), pp. 225-251, TD No. 481 (June 2003). 
R. GOLINELLI and G. PARIGI, Consumer sentiment and economic activity: a cross country comparison, 
Journal of Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 147-170, TD No. 484 
(September 2003). 
L. GAMBACORTA and P. E. MISTRULLI, Does bank capital affect lending behavior?, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol. 13 (4), pp. 436-457, TD No. 486 (September 2003). 
F. SPADAFORA, Il pilastro privato del sistema previdenziale: il caso del Regno Unito, Economia Pubblica, 
34, (5), pp. 75-114, TD No. 503 (June 2004). 
F. LIPPI. and S. NERI, Information variables for monetary policy in a small structural model of the euro 
area, Journal of Monetary Economics, v. 54, 4, pp. 1256-1270, TD No. 511 (July 2004). 
C. BENTIVOGLI and F. QUINTILIANI, Tecnologia e dinamica dei vantaggi comparati: un confronto fra 
quattro regioni italiane,  in C. Conigliani (eds.), Tra sviluppo e stagnazione: l’economia 
dell’Emilia-Romagna, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 522 (October 2004). 
G. GOBBI and F. LOTTI, Entry decisions and adverse selection: An empirical analysis of local credit 
markets, Journal of Financial services Research, Vol. 26 (3), pp. 225-244, TD No. 535 (December 
2004). 
E. GAIOTTI and F. LIPPI, Pricing behavior and the introduction of the euro: Evidence from a panel of 
restaurants, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 2004, Vol. 63, (3/4), pp. 491-526, 
TD No. 541 (February 2005). 
A. CICCONE, F. CINGANO and P. CIPOLLONE, The private and social return to schooling in Italy, Giornale 






L. DEDOLA and F. LIPPI, The monetary transmission mechanism: Evidence from the industries of 5 OECD 
countries, European Economic Review, 2005, Vol. 49, (6), pp. 1543-1569, TD No. 389 
(December 2000). 
D. Jr. MARCHETTI and F. NUCCI, Price stickiness and the contractionary effects of technology shocks. 
European Economic Review, v. 49, pp. 1137-1164, TD No. 392 (February 2001). 
G. CORSETTI, M. PERICOLI and M. SBRACIA, Some contagion, some interdependence: More pitfalls in tests 
of financial contagion, Journal of International Money and Finance, v. 24, 8, pp. 1177-1199, TD 
No. 408 (June 2001). 
GUISO L., L. PISTAFERRI and F. SCHIVARDI, Insurance within the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 
pp. 1054-1087, TD No. 414 (August 2001) 
R. CRISTADORO, M. FORNI, L. REICHLIN and G. VERONESE, A core inflation indicator for the euro area, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 37, 3, pp. 539-560, TD No. 435 (December 2001). 
F. ALTISSIMO, E. GAIOTTI and A. LOCARNO, Is money informative? Evidence from a large model used for 
policy analysis, Economic & Financial Modelling, v. 22, 2, pp. 285-304, TD No. 445 (July 2002). 
G. DE BLASIO and S. DI ADDARIO, Do workers benefit from industrial agglomeration?  Journal of regional 
Science, Vol. 45, (4), pp. 797-827, TD No. 453 (October 2002). 
R.  TORRINI,  Cross-country differences in self-employment rates: The role of institutions, Labour 
Economics, V. 12, 5, pp. 661-683, TD No. 459 (December 2002). 
A. CUKIERMAN and F. LIPPI, Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, v. 29, 11, pp. 1951-1983, TD No. 493 (June 2004). 
M. OMICCIOLI, Il credito commerciale: problemi e teorie, in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), 
Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 494 (June 2004). 
L. CANNARI, S. CHIRI and M. OMICCIOLI, Condizioni di pagamento e differenziazione della clientela, in L. 
Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali 
del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 495 (June 2004). 
P.  FINALDI  RUSSO  and  L.  LEVA,  Il debito commerciale in Italia: quanto contano le motivazioni 
finanziarie?,  in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti 
finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 496 (June 
2004). 
A. CARMIGNANI, Funzionamento della giustizia civile e struttura finanziaria delle imprese: il ruolo del 
credito commerciale, in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti 
finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 497 (June 
2004). 
G. DE BLASIO, Credito commerciale e politica monetaria: una verifica basata sull’investimento in scorte, 
in L. Cannari, S. Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e 
commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 498 (June 2004). 
G. DE BLASIO, Does trade credit substitute bank credit? Evidence from firm-level data. Economic notes, 
Vol. 34 (1), pp. 85-112, TD No. 498 (June 2004). 
A. DI CESARE, Estimating expectations of shocks using option prices, The ICFAI Journal of Derivatives 
Markets, Vol. 2, (1), pp. 42-53, TD No. 506 (July 2004). 
M. BENVENUTI and M. GALLO, Il ricorso al "factoring" da parte delle imprese italiane, in L. Cannari, S. 
Chiri e M. Omiccioli (eds.), Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali del credito 
tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, TD No. 518 (October 2004). 
L. CASOLARO and L. GAMBACORTA, Redditività bancaria e ciclo economico, Bancaria, v. 61, 3, pp. 19-27, 
TD No. 519 (October 2004). 
F. PANETTA,  F. SCHIVARDI and M. SHUM, Do mergers improve information? Evidence from the loan 
market, CEPR Discussion Paper, 4961, TD No. 521 (October 2004). 
P. DEL GIOVANE and R. SABBATINI, La divergenza tra inflazione rilevata e percepita in Italia, Bologna, Il 
Mulino,  TD No. 532 (December 2004). 
R. TORRINI, Quota dei profitti e redditività del capitale in Italia: un tentativo di interpretazione, Politica 
economica, v. 21, pp. 7-42, TD No. 551 (June 2005). 
M. OMICCIOLI, Il credito commerciale come “collateral”, in L. Cannari, S. Chiri, M. Omiccioli (eds.), 
Imprese o intermediari? Aspetti finanziari e commerciali del credito tra imprese in Italia, Bologna, 
il Mulino, TD No. 553 (June 2005). L. CASOLARO,  L.  GAMBACORTA  and  L.  GUISO,  Regulation, formal and informal enforcement and the 
development of the household loan market. Lessons from Italy, in Bertola G., Grant C. and Disney 
R. (eds.) The Economics of Consumer Credit: European Experience and Lessons from the US, 
Boston, MIT Press, TD No. 560 (September 2005). 
P. ANGELINI and F. LIPPI, Did inflation really soar after the euro changeover? Indirect evidence from ATM 
withdrawals, CEPR Discussion Paper, 4950, TD No. 581 (March 2006). 
S. DI  ADDARIO,  Job search in thick markets: Evidence from Italy, Oxford Discussion Paper 235, 




F. BUSETTI,  Tests of seasonal integration and cointegration in multivariate unobserved component 
models, Journal of Applied Econometrics, v. 21, 4, pp. 419-438, TD No. 476 (June 2003). 
C. BIANCOTTI, A polarization of inequality? The distribution of national Gini coefficients 1970-1996, 
Journal of Economic Inequality, v. 4, 1, pp. 1-32, TD No. 487 (March 2004). 
L. CANNARI and S. CHIRI, La bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente Nord-Sud (1998-2000), in L. 
Cannari, F. Panetta (a cura di), Il sistema finanziario e il Mezzogiorno: squilibri strutturali e divari 
finanziari, Bari, Cacucci, TD No. 490 (March 2004). 
M. BOFONDI and G. GOBBI, Information barriers to entry into credit markets, Review of Finance, Vol. 10 
(1), pp. 39-67,  TD No. 509 (July 2004). 
LIPPI F. and W. FUCHS, Monetary union with voluntary participation, Review of Economic Studies, 73, 
pp. 437-457 TD No. 512  (July 2004). 
GAIOTTI E. and A. SECCHI, Is there a cost channel of monetary transmission? An investigation into the 
pricing behaviour of 2000 firms, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 38, 8, pp. 2013-2038 
TD No. 525 (December 2004). 
A. BRANDOLINI,  P.  CIPOLLONE  and  E.  VIVIANO,  Does the ILO definition capture all unemployment?, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, v. 4, 1, pp. 153-179, TD No. 529 (December 
2004). 
A. BRANDOLINI, L. CANNARI, G. D’ALESSIO and I. FAIELLA, Household wealth distribution in Italy in the 
1990s, In E. N. Wolff (ed.) International Perspectives on Household Wealth, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, TD No. 530 (December 2004). 
P. DEL G IOVANE and R. SABBATINI, Perceived and measured inflation after the launch of the Euro: 
Explaining the gap in Italy, Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, v. 65, 2 , pp. 155-192, 
TD No. 532 (December 2004). 
M. CARUSO,  Monetary policy impulses, local output and the transmission mechanism, Giornale degli 
economisti e annali di economia, v. 65, 1, pp. 1-30, TD No. 537 (December 2004). 
L. GUISO and M. PAIELLA, The role of risk aversion in predicting individual behavior, In P. A. Chiappori e 
C. Gollier (eds.) Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets: Theory and Policy Implications, 
Monaco, CESifo, TD No. 546 (February 2005). 
G. M. TOMAT, Prices product differentiation and quality measurement: A comparison between hedonic 
and matched model methods, Research in Economics, No. 60, pp. 54-68, TD No. 547 (February 
2005). 
F. LOTTI, E. SANTARELLI and M. VIVARELLI, Gibrat's law in a medium-technology industry: Empirical 
evidence for Italy, in E. Santarelli (ed.), Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation: the Dynamics 
of Firms and Industries, New York, Springer, TD No. 555 (June 2005). 
F. BUSETTI, S. FABIANI and A. HARVEY, Convergence of prices and rates of inflation, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, v. 68, 1, pp. 863-878, TD No. 575 (February 2006). 
M. CARUSO, Stock market fluctuations and money demand in Italy, 1913 - 2003, Economic Notes, v. 35, 1, 
pp. 1-47, TD No. 576 (February 2006). 
S. IRANZO, F. SCHIVARDI and E. TOSETTI, Skill dispersion and productivity: An analysis with matched 
data, CEPR Discussion Paper, 5539, TD No. 577 (February 2006).   
M. BUGAMELLI and A. ROSOLIA,  Produttività e concorrenza estera, Rivista di politica economica, 3, TD 
No. 578 (February 2006). 
R. BRONZINI and G. DE BLASIO, Evaluating the impact of investment incentives: The case of Italy’s Law 
488/92. Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 60, n. 2, pag. 327-349, TD No. 582 (March 2006). 
A. DI CESARE, Do market-based indicators anticipate rating agencies? Evidence for international banks,  
Economic Notes, v. 35, pp. 121-150,  TD No. 593 (May 2006). L.  DEDOLA  and  S.  NERI,  What does a technology shock do? A VAR analysis with model-based sign 
restrictions,  Journal of Monetary Economics, v. 54, 2, pp. 512 - 549,  TD No. 607 (December 
2006). 
R. GOLINELLI and S.  MOMIGLIANO, Real-time determinants of fiscal policies in the euro area, Journal of 
Policy Modeling, v. 28, 9, pp. 943-64, TD No. 609 (December 2006). 
P. ANGELINI, S. GERLACH, G. GRANDE, A. LEVY, F. PANETTA, R. PERLI,S.  RAMASWAMY, M.  SCATIGNA 






S. DI  ADDARIO  and  E.  PATACCHINI,  Wages and the city. Evidence from Italy, Development Studies 
Working Papers 231, Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, TD No. 570 (January 2006). 
F.  LOTTI and J.  MARCUCCI,  Revisiting the empirical evidence on firms' money demand, Journal of 
Economics and Business, v. 59, 1, pp. 51-73, TD No. 595 (May 2006). 
L. MONTEFORTE,  Aggregation bias in macro models: Does it matter for the euro area?, Economic 





P. ANGELINI, Liquidity and announcement effects in the euro area, Giornale degli economisti e annali di 
economia,  TD No. 451 (October 2002). 
S. MAGRI, Italian households' debt: The participation to the debt market and the size of the loan, Empirical 
Economics, TD No. 454 (October 2002). 
G. FERRERO, Monetary policy, learning and the speed of convergence, Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, TD No. 499 (June 2004). 
M. PAIELLA, Does wealth affect consumption? Evidence for Italy, Journal of Macroeconomics, v. 29, 1, 
TD No. 510 (July 2004). 
A. ANZUINI and A. LEVY, Monetary policy shocks in the new EU members: A VAR approach, Applied 
Economics TD No. 514 (July 2004). 
S. MOMIGLIANO, J. Henry and P. Hernández de Cos, The impact of government budget on prices: Evidence 
from macroeconometric models, Journal of Policy Modelling, TD No. 523 (October 2004). 
D. Jr. MARCHETTI and F. Nucci, Pricing behavior and the response of hours to productivity shocks, 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, TD No. 524 (December 2004). 
R. BRONZINI, FDI Inflows, Agglomeration and host country firms’ size: Evidence from Italy, Regional 
Studies, TD No. 526 (December 2004). 
A.  NOBILI,  Assessing the predictive power of financial spreads in the euro area: does parameters 
instability matter?, Empirical Economics, v. 31, 4, pp. , TD No. 544 (February 2005). 
P. ANGELINI and A. Generale, On the evolution of firm size distributions, American Economic Review, TD 
No. 549 (June 2005). 
A.  DALMAZZO  and  G. DE BLASIO,  Production and consumption externalities of human capital: An 
empirical study for Italy, Journal of Population Economics, TD No. 554 (June 2005). 
R. FELICI and M. PAGNINI,, Distance, bank heterogeneity and entry in local banking markets, The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, TD No. 557 (June 2005). 
R. BRONZINI and G. DE BLASIO, Una valutazione degli incentivi pubblici agli investimenti, Rivista Italiana 
degli Economisti , TD No. 582 (March 2006). 
P. CIPOLLONE and A. ROSOLIA, Social interactions in high school: Lessons from an earthquake, American 
Economic Review, TD No. 596 (September 2006). 
F. BUSETTI and A. HARVEY, Testing for trend, Econometric Theory  TD No. 614 (February 2007). 